This paper studies sustainability of economic growth considering the risk of natural disasters caused by pollution in an endogenous growth model with physical and human capital accumulation. We consider an environmental tax policy, and show that economic growth is sustainable only if the tax rate on the polluting input is increased over time and that the long-term rate of economic growth follows an inverted V-shaped curve relative to the growth rate of the environmental tax. The social welfare is maximized under a positive steadystate growth in which faster accumulation of human capital compensates the productivity loss due to declining use of the polluting input.
Introduction
is in turn suspected to increase hurricane frequency and intensity (Emamuel, 2005; Webster et al., 2005) .
Those observations suggest that there is a two-way causality between economic activities and the occurrence of natural disasters. This paper investigates the sustainability of economic growth in the presence of this two-way causality, by introducing the endogenous risk of natural disasters into a Uzawa-Lucas type of endogenous growth model. Following the literature (e.g., Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Stokey, 1998) , we assume that polluting inputs such as fossil fuels are necessary for economic activities and those inputs are subject to an environmental tax.
3 Differently from earlier studies, however, this paper examines the case in which the use of polluting inputs raises the probability that capital stocks are destroyed by natural disasters. Agents make saving decisions taking into account the possibilities of loss of asset due to natural disasters.
Using the model, we show that the economic growth is, in fact, not sustainable if the (per-unit) tax rate on polluting inputs is kept constant. Intuitively, under the constant tax rate, firms are willing to use increasing amounts of polluting inputs as the economy grows. However, as increased use of polluting inputs raises the risk of natural disasters, it reduce incentive agents to invest in capital stock since they face a higher possibilities of asset loss. Thus, even in the long run, capital stock cannot exceed a constant threshold under a constant tax rate.
To overcome this limitation, we next consider a time-varying tax on polluting inputs. If the per-unit tax rate is raised over time, private firms owing a Cobb-Douglas production technology will increase the use of other inputs, including human capital, relative to polluting inputs. As a result, the use of polluting inputs can be bounded above, making the economic growth sustainable. It is also shown that the growth rate of environmental tax has both positive and negative effects on economic growth. The faster the rate at which the environmental tax is increased, the lower is the asymptotic amount of pollution and therefore the lower is probability of disasters.
This gives households more incentive to save, which promotes growth. However, the increased cost of using polluting input faced by private firms reduces their productivity at each date, which has a negative effect on growth. Due to those opposite effects, the rate of economic growth rate is shown to follow an inverted V-shaped curve relative to the growth rate of environmental tax.
Having shown that the sustained growth is feasible, this paper then examine whether it is desirable or not. This question may seem trivial, but in a AK-growth model with pollution Stokey (1998) shows that, even when production technology allows sustained growth, it is theoretically possible that agents prefer a no-growth state with a good environment. 4 Contrary to Stokey's analysis, we show that the social welfare is maximized on a steady-state growth path, where the environmental tax is raised at a positive rate, although this does not coincide with the growth maximizing path.
The difference of our result from Stokey's stems not from our assumption that the use of polluting input only affects the risk of natural disasters without directly affecting consumer's utility. 5 Rather, it comes from the our two-sector specification that the growth is driven both by physical and human capital accumulation. This paper's analysis shows that sustained growth with a Cobb-Douglas technology is feasible under a limited use of polluting input because human capital stock is accumulated much faster than the rate at which output is increased. In fact, provided that human capital stock has lower degree of vulnerability to disasters, as suggested by Skidmore 4 Stokey (1998) assumed additive separable preference for consumption and pollution in which the marginal utility from consumption is declining whereas the marginal disutility from pollution is increasing. Then, as consumption increases due to capital accumulation, reducing pollution becomes more important than increasing consumption. She shows that further growth is not optimal at a high level of capital stock.
5 In section 5, we examine the case in which pollution directly causes disutility to consumers, in addition to raising the risk of disasters. It is shown that a positive steady-state growth is compatible to welfare maximization even in this case.
and Toya (2002) , the risk raises incentives for more investment in human capital stock relative to physical capital stock.
To our best knowledge, this study is a first attempt to examine the consequences of natural disasters in an endogenous growth model. This does not mean, of course, that our study is independent from the previous literature. In fact, great attention has been paid to the sustainability of economic growth in the literature of growth theory, by noticing that the finite nature of natural environment may potentially restrict sustainability of economic growth. With regard to the finiteness of natural resources, Aghion and Howitt (1998) , Scholz and Ziemes (1999) , Schou (2000) , Grimaud and Rougé (2003) , and Agnai, Gutiérrez and Iza (2005) examined sustainability of economic growth in endogenous growth models with non-renewable resources.
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Complementary to those studies, Stokey (1998) and Uzawa (2003) examined sustainability focusing on emission of pollutants. Since the global atmosphere is finite, the negative effects from pollutants will become unacceptably serious when the usage of polluting input increases without bound. Therefore, both Stokey (1998) and Uzawa (2003) concludes that, without exogenous technological change, it is optimal for the economy to converge to a no-growth steady state. Their conclusions are different from ours because they consider only accumulation of physical capital, whereas we consider both human and physical capital. In this respect, our study is more related to a two sector model developed by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) , where accumulation of knowledge is explicitly incorporated. Specifically, Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) assumed that the amount of pollution cannot be increased in the long-run and showed that, if output can grow at the same rate as that of physical and human capital for a constant level of pollution, 7 sustained growth is both feasible 6 For example, Grimaud and Rougé (2003) analyzed sustainability of economic growth introducing a non-renewable natural resource into a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model. They showed that whether both optimal and equilibrium growth is positive at the steady-state depends on the value of the subjective discount rate relative to the productivity of R&D.
7 They focused on the case in which the production function exhibits constant rate to scale and optimal.
While their conclusions are similar to ours, the settings in the model differs in two respects. First, we does not assume that pollution cannot increase in the long run, but show that a path in which pollution increases without bound is not chosen in equilibrium since it reduces the incentive to save of consumers, who face increasingly high possibility of asset losses due to disasters. Second, we consider a more natural setting in which the production function exhibits constant return to scale with respect to all production factors-including polluting inputs. This means that, if the amount of pollution is fixed, the production function faces decreasing returns to scale (DRS).
We show that, even under this more severe condition, sustained growth is both feasible and desirable since the DRS can be overcome by accumulating human capital more rapidly than the rate of economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and proves that growth cannot be sustained under a constant tax rate on polluting inputs. The steady-state growth with an increasing environmental tax is analyzed in Section 3. The social planners's problem is examined in Section 4 so as to investigate the desirability of sustained growth. Section 5 considers an extension of the model in which pollution harms the utility of consumers as well as increases the risk of disasters. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
This section presents a model of natural disasters and economic growth. In the first subsection, the risk of natural disasters is introduced into a two-sector growth model based on Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1998) . In the second subsection, the behavior of households and firms is examined. The third subsection summarizes the equilibrium (CRS) with respect to K t and (H t P t ), where P t represents the level of pollution. This means that, if all production factors K t , H t and P t , are doubled, the output is more than doubled; i.e., the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to K t , H t and P t . In contrast,
we maintain a standard setting in which output is CRS with respect to all production factors.
conditions. The final subsection proves that sustained growth is not possible when the environmental tax rate is kept constant.
The risk of natural disasters
In the model, output is produced by a constant-returns-to-scale production technology using physical capital K t , human capital H t , and polluting input P t such as fossil fuels that emits pollutants or greenhouse gases. The production function is given by:
where u t ≥ 0 is the time share devoted to production of goods, α ∈ (0, 1/2) is a constant share of physical capital, 8 and β ∈ (0, 1 − α) is that of the polluting input.
Note that production function (1) exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to all inputs including P t . Output is either consumed or added to physical capital stock.
Since we focus on the risk of natural disasters, we ignore the extraction cost and/or production cost of polluting inputs and finite nature of natural resources. The risk of natural disasters on capital stock is assumed to be inevitable and to depend on the amount of pollution.
Specifically, suppose that economy consists of continuum of local areas. Let q t be the arrival rate of natural disasters per unit of time at each area:
where q and q are positive constants. Equation (2) says that the arrival rate raises as the amount of aggregate polluting inputs increases, as in the case of hurricanes and fossil fuels. When a natural disaster occurs at an area, it causes damage to physical capital. For example, if natural disasters occur at an area where the existing aggregate physical capital stock is K t , the expected loss of physical capital is ϕ K t , where ϕ > 0 is the average damage to physical capital stock. Note that, for various reasons, a natural disaster harms human capital stock as well. 9 Similarly to ϕ, define ψ > 0 as the average damage to human capital stock. The damage on human capital measured in relative to the size of the existing stock is typically smaller than the damage on physical capital, which implies that ϕ would be smaller than ψ.
For simplicity, each area is assumed to be small enough and the occurrence of natural disasters in one area is assumed not to be correlated to others.
10 By the law of large numbers with (2), the aggregate damage to physical capital stock and human capital stock are respectively:
Let δ K and δ H be the constant rates of depreciation of physical capital stock and human capital stock, respectively. Then, similarly to Lucas (1988), the resource constraints for physical and human capital stocks are written as:
where
, and C t , B, and 1 − u t are the aggregate consumption, the constant productivity of human capital accumulation, and the fraction of time devoted to production of human capital, respectively.
Equations (5) and (6) shows that the risk of natural disasters effectively augments the depreciation rates of physical and human capital stocks, in proportion to the use of polluting input.
9 The death toll in Katrina rose to over 1000 (NOAA, 2005) and the number of the injured was much more. In addition, many education institutions are forced to remain closed for extended periods of time and a large number of data and documents storing valuable knowledge are lost after the disasters pass.
Observe that, unlike standard endogenous growth models, the right hand sides of equations (5) and (6) are not homogenous of degree one in terms of quantities. This implies that balanced growth that exhibits a homothetic expansion is not feasible, reflecting the finiteness of natural environment.
The market economy
Since firms do not take into consideration the externality that the use of polluting inputs increases the risk of natural disasters, the market equilibrium does not correspond with the solution of the social planner's problem. The followings consider explicitly the market economy where per-unit tax τ t , in terms of final goods, is levied on the use of polluting inputs. The government balances its budget at each moment and equally distribute the tax revenue T t = τ t P t among households in a lump-sum fashion.
Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived homogeneous households. Each household owns physical capital stock, k t , and human capital stock, h t .
However, due to natural disasters, they are faced with the risk of damages to both types of capital stock. The insurance market is assumed to be complete. Under this assumption, it is optimal for households to take out insurance that cover the all losses associated with natural disasters. Since their expected damages to physical capital stock and human capital stock are q t ϕk t and q t ψh t , respectively, the budget constraint of households can be written as:
where r t , w t , and c t denote the real interest rate, the real wage rate, and the amount of consumption, respectively. Note that the cost associated with depreciation and insurance is paid by the owner of the capital.
The utility function of the representative household is given by:
where θ > 1 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ρ is the rate of time preference. We assume B − δ H > ρ so that households have enough incentive to investment in human capital. Given the time paths of r t , w t , P t , τ t and T t , each household maximizes (9) subject to the constraints (7) and (8). From the first-order condition for maximization problem, we obtain the Keynes-Ramsey Rule:
This condition is similar to that obtained in the original Uzawa-Lucas model, except that the depreciation rate is augmented by the risk of natural disasters, ϕP t .
The shadow price of human capital relative to that of physical capital is w t /B, which equals to the market price of human capital measured by physical capital stock. Hence, the arbitrage condition between human capital investment and physical capital investment is given by:
11 Equations (7)- (8) implicitly assume that damaged human capital is compensated in the form of human capital. Obviously, a more realistic setting is that this compensation is done in the form of goods. Nonetheless, as long as the amount of compensation in terms of goods is calculated using the appropriate price of human capital, w t /B, the equilibrium outcomes do not change in the aggregate level.
In (11) 
where c 
Firms
There are a continuum of firms producing final goods in competitive market. We consider a representative firm maximizing its profit. The firm pays the wages for labor input, the rental rate for physical capital input, and the environmental tax as well. Given factor prices r t , w t and τ t , the profit maximization problem is:
where N t ≡ u t H t is the amount of human capital employed by the firm. The firstorder conditions for this problem are
and
Substituting the profit maximizing polluting input,
production function (1), the output can be written as:
When written in the form of (14), it becomes clear that the environmental tax lowers the effective total factor pro- −β) . Using this notation, the first order conditions are expressed
Equilibrium conditions
In this economy, the equilibrium path is characterized by the motions of aggregate physical capital stock K t , aggregate human capital stock H t , aggregate labor supply u t , aggregate consumption C t , and the use of polluting input P t . This subsection summarizes the equilibrium conditions for those variables.
Note that, since the population is homogenous and normalized to unity,
H t = h t , C t = c t , and u t = N t /H t hold in equilibrium. Substituting factor prices (15) and (16) as well as the lump-sum transfer T t = τ t P t into the budget constraint of households (7) yields the evolution of physical capital stock:
From the production function of human capital (8), the evolution of aggregate human capital stock is given as:
Substituting factor prices (15) and (16) into the arbitrage condition (11), we obtain the evolution of labor supply u t :
The dynamics of consumption is given by the Keynes-Ramsey Rule (10) where r t is replaced by (15):
Finally, from the firm's f.o.c. (see the previous subsection), the amount of polluting input is determined by:
The equilibrium dynamics is determined by equations (17)- (21), exogenously given time path of τ t , initial levels of K 0 and H 0 , and the TVCs (12) and (13).
Note that the TVCs can be simply stated using equilibrium conditions. From (17) and (20), the growth rate of
from (10), (11) and (18), the growth rate of h t (w t /B)c −θ t e −ρt is −Bu t . Therefore, a sufficient condition for the TVC is that those growth rates are negative in the long run:
Condition (22) implies that the TVCs are satisfied when more than fraction 1 − α of output is consumed and the fraction of time used for production is positive. For later use, we also present necessary conditions for the TVC which are slightly weaker than (22):
Condition (24) 
Sustainability under a constant tax rate
Observe, from (21), that pollution increases in proportion to output Y t if the government do not change the environmental tax rate. Since the increasing usage of polluting inputs makes natural disasters more and more frequent, it seems that eco-
The first term is finite. In addition, when lim t→∞ut /u t < 0, the integral of the second term is also finite. Therefore the TVC is violated
nomic growth is not sustainable under such a static environmental policy. This subsection formally proves that this insight is correct.
Proposition 1 If the per-unit tax on polluting input is constant, then economic
growth is not sustainable in the sense that aggregate consumption cannot grow in the long run.
Proof: The proof goes via reductio ad absurdum. When the government sets a constant environmental tax rate (i.e., τ t = τ 0 for all t), the Keynes-Ramsey Rule (20) can be rewritten, from (21), as:
This equation states that, if consumption grow in the long-run (i.e., C t → ∞ as t → ∞), the sign of the value in the parentheses must be positive. Hence, K t must be bounded above by a constant value τ 0 α/ϕβ (i.e., lim t→∞ K t < τ 0 α/ϕβ).
To interpret this result, observe that that, from (14) and (15), the rental price of physical capital is r t = αY t /K t and therefore the last term of represents marginal rate of return of holding capital net of insurance cost ϕP t = ϕβY t /τ 0 . As physical capital accumulates, the insurance cost increases in relative to interest rate due to increased risk of natural disasters. Since this lowers the incentive to save, the stock of physical capital should not become too large in order to maintain sustained growth.
This raises another question, however, of maintaining output growth under a limited size of physical capital. From (14), the positive growth rate of output requires the positive growth rate of human capital stock devoted to production due to the supremum of K t . That is, lim t→∞Ṅt ≥ 0 must hold in order to support increasing consumption. Under a constant environmental tax rate equation, (19) can be rewritten as:
Consider the behavior of both hands of the above equation in the long-run. The left hand side implies the growth rate of wage, which eventually becomes negative value, − αṄ t /N t . Conversely, the right hand is given by:
which is the difference between the marginal rate of return on both types of capital stock. From the condition for the positive growth rate of consumption derived above, the sign of the value in the parentheses must be positive, and thus, the value of the right hand side goes to infinity as Y t → ∞. These results imply that the equality in (19) fails to hold, and therefore C t and Y t cannot grow in the long run.
The proof of proposition clarifies that, under a constant environmental tax rate, economic growth is not sustainable since agents lose the incentive to save when output and the risk of natural disasters increases to a certain level. The risk of disasters rises proportionally with output, and this follows from the fact that firms face a constant tax rate on the polluting input P t (see equation 21). This result provides an anticipation that, in order to sustain economic growth, it might be necessary to increase the rate of environmental tax increased over time so as to prevent the risk of disasters to rise excessively when output grows. In the remaining of the paper, we consider such a time-varying tax policy.
Sustainable Growth
This section examines the possibility of long-run growth under a time-varying tax policy. In the literature of endogenous growth, long-term analysis is usually done by focusing on balanced growth paths, which is sometimes called steady-state growth paths, where the growth rates of all variables are constant. However, in the present model, the economy do not typically have a steady-state growth path primarily because the introduction of the endogenous risk of natural disasters (and therefore the endogenous effective depreciation rate of capital) makes the structure of the model intrinsically non-homothetic. Nonetheless, it does not rule out the possibility that, under an appropriate tax policy, the economy converges, or asymptotes, to a steady-state growth path as will be examined in this section.
Specifically, we seek to find a tax policy realizes an asymptotically steady-state growth path, which is defined as follows. In the remaining of the paper, we focus on the sustainable, asymptotically steadystate growth paths and refer them simply as steady-state growth paths unless it causes any ambiguity. Note that the requirements for a sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth also restricts the asymptotic behavior of tax rate τ t because
) must be satisfied in the long run. In particular, for g * and g P to be well-defined and finite, the asymptotic growth rate of tax rate
must also be well-defined and finite. This means, in the long run, the per-unit tax rate on the polluting input must be changed at a constant rate. The main task of this section is to examine the dependence of long-term rate of economic growth g * on the (long-term) growth rate of environmental tax g τ . In the first subsection, we 13 The notion of growth path presented here is essentially the same as the notion of a nondegenerate, asymptotically balanced growth path proposed by Palivos et al. (1997, Definition 2) . We call it steady-state growth rather than balanced because an important property of the equilibrium path which will be derived below is that it exhibits different growth rates among production inputs.
Correspondingly, the notion of sustainability in our definition is weaker than the notion of nondegenerate growth by Palivos et al. (1997) in that we do not require every production input to grow at positive rate. In fact, we show an important case of the analysis is that in which the growth rate of one production input (namely, polluting input P t ) is negative and converges to zero. Even in this case, the growth rates of output and consumption can be positive if the growth rates of other inputs are positive and more than offset the declining use of a certain type of input.
present the conditions that must be satisfied on the steady-state growth path. In the second and third subsections, we examine two different possibilities of steady-state growth. The final subsection summarizes.
Conditions for Sustainable, Asymptotically Steady-State Growth Path
We first show that, in the long run, the economy cannot grow faster than the growth rate of environmental tax.
Lemma 1 On any asymptotically steady-state growth path, g
Proof: in Appendix.
Intuitively, if production grows so fast that the usage of polluting input P t = βY t /τ t become infinite in the long run, natural disasters occurs increasingly frequently. In such a situation, however, both physical and human capital deteriorate at an accelerating rate, contradicting with the initial assumption that output can grow. One implication of Lemma 1 is that sustainable steady-state paths (with g * > 0) are obtained only when g τ > 0; i.e., only when the per-unit tax rate is increased exponentially. This confirms the anticipation provided in the end of Section 2.4.
Another implication is that g * ≤ g τ leads to g P ≡ lim t→∞Ṗt /P t ≤ 0 from (21).
Since the amount of polluting input P t is nonnegative, this means that P t converges to a constant value in the long-run. We denote this asymptotic value by P * ≡ lim t→∞ P t .
Note that P * = 0 ifṖ t /P t < 0. Even though we limit our attention to sustainable growth paths, we should not rule out this possibility. It is true that output Y t is zero if P t = 0 given the Cobb-Douglas function (1) in which polluting inputs such as fossil fuels are necessary; that is, a steady-state growth path in a conventional sense with P t = P * = 0 is obviously inconsistent with sustainable growth. However, we are considering asymptotically steady-state growth path in which P t asymptotes to P * , and therefore P t does not necessarily coincide with P * = 0 at any date.
Furthermore, lim t→∞ P t = 0 does not necessarily mean lim t→∞ Y t = 0 since other production factors in (1), namely K t and H t , can grow unboundedly.
We next show that these requirements and transversality conditions determine the growth rates of u t , K t , and C t .
Lemma 2 On any sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth path,
(ii) g u = 0 and g K = g C = g * .
The result that physical capital and consumption grow in parallel with output is a common property in models of endogenous growth (e.g., Lucas 1988 , Palivos et al. 1997 . However, in our model, the growth rate of human capital is not the same as output. Differentiating production function (14) logarithmically with respect to
where we used N t = u t H t . This equation implies that conditions for the steady-growth path (i.e, g K = g * and g u = 0) are satisfied only when
Equation ( (25) for (17)- (21), the equilibrium conditions that must hold in the long run can be represented as follows.
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Evolution of
Arbitrage condition:
Keynes-Ramsey rule: − θg
Asymptotic pollution:
Given g τ > 0 set by the government, the five conditions, (26) (28) and (29), we obtain the asymptotic value of polluting input:
which is decreasing in g τ . Recall that, as shown by (30), the asymptotic value must be nonnegative: P * ≥ 0. From (31), we can see that the condition is satisfied if g τ is within the following region:
where g max is positive from the assumption that B − δ H > ρ. Hence, Case 1 (i.e.,
Using g * = g τ , we obtain the asymptotic values of other variable from (26)- (29):
Substituting (31) into (33)- (35) and using g τ ∈ (0, g max ], it can be confirmed that 
Proof: Stability is examined in Appendix.
We assume parameters satisfy ψ/ϕ < (1 − 2α)/(1 − α − β) in the remaining of the paper.
3.3 Case 2: P * = 0 and g * < g τ Next, we examine the possibility that the amount of polluting input asymptotically converges toward zero on the steady-state growth path. Substituting P * = 0 for (28) and (29) yields the steady-state growth rate:
Contrary to Case 1 in which g * = g τ , equation (36) shows that the long-term rate of growth is decreasing in g τ . Recall that, for the amount of polluting input P t = βY t /τ t to converge toward zero as assumed, growth rate g * must be lower than g τ . Equation
(36) shows that, for condition g * < g τ to be satisfied, the rate of environmental tax must be raised faster than g max , where g max is defined in (32). However, equation (36) also implies that economic growth cannot be sustained when g τ is too high:
. Therefore, a sustainable, asymptotically steady-state with P * = 0 obtains only if g τ ∈ (g max , g lim ), for which range of policies g * ∈ (0, g τ ) holds.
Substituting P * = 0 and (36) into (26)- (29), we obtain the asymptotically steadystate values for other variables:
From g τ ∈ (g max , g lim ), it can be confirmed that z * > 0, χ * > 0, (1−α)z * −χ * < 0, and u * ∈ (0, 1), implying that transversality condition (22) 
Summary
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 shows that there are two possible patterns of sustained growth. Observe that those two possibilities are mutually exclusive-that is, under a given time path of environmental tax at most one lemma is applicable. Therefore, the sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth path is always unique; it is characterized by Lemma 3 if g τ ∈ (0, g max ], and by Lemma 4 if g τ ∈ (g max , g lim ). The following proposition states the main result. 17 This result can be interpreted as follows.
Proposition 2 A sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth path exists if and only if the per-unit tax on polluting input is raised over time so that its asymptotic growth rate, g τ , is strictly positive and less than g
lim ≡ (1 − α − β)β −1 (B − δ H − ρ).
When it exists, it is unique and saddle stable. The long-term rate of economic growth follows an inverted-V shape against gτ ∈ (0, g lim ), and it is maximized at
17 Figure 1 is derived as follows. g C and g K are the same as g * , which is given by g * = g τ for g τ ∈ (0, g max ) and (36) for g τ ∈ (g max , g lim ). Given g * , g H and g P are determined by (25) and
Finally P * is given by (31) for g τ ∈ (0, g max ) and P * = 0 When the environmental tax rate is asymptotically constant (i.e., g τ = 0), the asymptotic growth rates of all endogenous variables are zero, which means that the economy settles to a no-growth steady state. In this steady state, the amount of pollution converges to P * = (B − δ H − ρ)/ψ ≡ P , which causes the probability of natural disasters (i.e., the risk of losing their physical and human capital) so high that agents loses incentive to save. Interestingly, observe that the asymptotic level of P t does not depend on the level of the environmental tax rate, τ t , as long as it is constant. Nonetheless, since Y t = τ t P t /β from (21), a higher tax rate induces the economy to converges to a higher output level by influencing the equilibrium path in transition.
When the government raises the per-unit tax rate on polluting inputs at an exponential rate (g τ > 0), the asymptotic level of P t can be kept below P so that economic growth may be maintained without bound. When g τ in increased within the range of (0, g max ], the long-run amount of pollution P * decreases, and so does the risk of natural disasters. The reduced risk of natural disasters encourages agents to accumulate capital at a faster speed. As a result, the growth rate of physical capital g K increase in parallel with g τ (i.e., g K = g τ ). The growth rate of human capital, g H , also increases with g τ , and more rapidly than physical capital. (Recall the discussion in Section 3.1 for why agents are willing to do so.) This makes possible sustained growth under asymptotically constant use of polluting input.
However, accelerating the rise of tax rate does not necessarily enhance economic growth because it also has a negative effect on growth through limiting the use of P t , which is a necessary input for the Cobb-Douglas production process. Specifically, when the environmental tax rate is raised so rapidly that g τ exceeds g max , the use of polluting inputs P t is continually reduced, converging asymptotically to zero level (P t → P * = 0). In this case, a further acceleration of g τ no longer can reduce the asymptotic probability of natural disasters (because is is already at the lowest level), but only accelerates the fall of the effective productivity of private firms Aτ −β/(1−β) .
As a result, g * is no longer increasing in parallel with g τ , but decreasing in g τ . An extreme case is that of g τ ≥ g lim , for which case, even though the risk of natural disasters is a the lowest level, the fall of the effective productivity Aτ −β/(1−β) is so fast that it cannot be compensated by a faster accumulation of human capital, resulting in zero or negative growth.
Welfare
The previous section established that sustained growth is feasible by raising the rate of environmental tax rate over time.
It is yet to shown, however, such an environmental policy is desirable in terms of welfare. This section investigates the social planner's problem so as to derive the welfare-maximizing environmental policy, and compares it with the growth maximizing policy derived in the previous section.
The social planner maximizes (9) subject to the following constraints:
From the first-order conditions for optimality, it can be confirmed that the dynamics of K t , H t , and C t , and the arbitrage condition between two types of capital stocks are exactly the same as (17)- (20), which are parts of market equilibrium conditions. Since the social planner takes into consideration the externality of polluting emissions, that is, the risk of natural disasters, it chooses the amount of polluting input according to the following rule:
Equation (42) says that the use of polluting input should be determined so that its marginal product (βY t /P t ) is equal to the marginal disadvantage of using polluting inputs. The marginal disadvantage is given by the expression in the large parenthesis, which is the sum of increases in damage to physical capital stock and in damage to human capital stock, both measured in terms of final goods (in particular, (
is the shadow price of human capital in terms of final goods).
Recall that, in the market economy, firms choose P t according to (21); i.e., P t = βY t /τ t . This means that if the tax rate at each date is determined by
then the optimality condition for P t , equation (42), is satisfied. Recall again that other conditions for social optimum is the same as that for the market equilibrium.
Therefore, if the government set the environmental tax rate by following rule (43), then the market equilibrium path completely traces the social optimal path.
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Although it may be convenient in practice to follow a policy rule than calculating the time path of tax rate at the outset, equation (43) is not so informative about the equilibrium path that result from such a policy. Equation (43) implies that τ t is function of K t , Y t , and u t . However, K t , Y t , and u t are endogenously determined depending the future path of τ t that is expected by consumers. That is, the welfare maximizing path is given as a solution to a dynamic fixed point problem.
Since it is excessively difficult to solve this problem directly, we limit our attention to sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth paths and examine whether there is a path that satisfies optimality condition (42) within this family of paths. Note that on any sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth path, both the LHS and the RHS of condition (42) asymptotes to constants. Specifically,
must hold in the long run, where P * , z * and u * represents the asymptotic values of P t , z t ≡ Y t /K t and u t . We know from Proposition 2 that, whenever the equilibrium path asymptotes to a sustainable steady-state growth path, the asymptotic growth rate of the optimal tax rate, g opt τ ≡ lim t→∞τt /τ t , is well defined and that g τ ∈ (0, g lim ). In addition, P * , z * and u * are determined as a function of g τ . Therefore, we examine whether there exist a value of g τ within (0, g lim ) such that (44) holds. Figure 3 plots the RHS and the LHS of equation (44) against g τ . The actual amount of asymptotic pollution (the LHS) is positive but decreasing in g τ for g τ ∈ (0, g max ), and it is zero for g τ ≥ g max . On the other hand, the optimal amount of asymptotic pollution (the RHS) is positive for all g τ > 0. The both curves are are continuous in g τ . In addition, it can be shown that the intercept of the RHS is lower than that of the LHS whenever ρ or β is sufficiently small. 19 Therefore, unless both β and ρ are large, the two curves have an intersecting point within g τ ∈ (0, g max ), which 19 Observe from (31), (33) and (35) 
Substituting these into both sides of (44) and rearranging terms shows that the prerequisite is satisfied if and only if β < (αϕ/(
is satisfied whenever ρ or β is sufficiently small. Figure 2 : Determination of the optimal growth rate of environmental tax. The figure plots the RHS and the LHS of condition (44) against g τ . The asymptotic growth rate of optimal environmental tax is g opt τ , is given by the intersection, which is lower than the growth maximizing rate, g max . The parameters are the same as in Figure 1 .
represents the growth rate of optimal tax rate, g
the long-term rate of economic growth g * coincides with g opt τ , and therefore it is positive. The following proposition states the obtained result.
Proposition 3
Suppose that the welfare of consumers is given by (9) Thus the above analysis shows that the sustained growth implemented by raising the environmental tax rate is not only feasible but also desirable. It is also notable, however, that the optimal policy does not coincide with the growth maximizing policy since g opt τ < g max . That is, if the government care about welfare it should employ milder policy for protecting environment than when growth is their only concern.
This result may seem at odds with the usual growth vs. environment arguments, but its reasoning is similar to the modified golden rule argument familiar to economists.
Although an aggressive environmental policy that aims to eliminate the emission of pollutants in the long run (i.e., P * = 0) may maximize the economic growth rate in the very long run, the cost in the form of reduced effective productivity that must be incurred in the transition can overwhelm the benefit that cannot be reaped until far future.
Disutility of Pollution
Our result that the sustained growth is both feasible and desirable is in contrast to the previous literature. Notably, Stokey (1998) has shown that even when sustained growth is feasible, it is not desirable when production of goods emits pollutants that harm the utility of consumers. The difference of the results of course comes from the setting of models. More specifically, our model significantly differs from Stokey (1998) in two aspects; (i) we are considering human capital accumulation differently from Stokey's AK model; (ii) so far pollutants are assumed to cause disasters but do not directly give disutility.
In this subsection, we clarify that the critical reason behind the difference in the results is not (ii) but (i). To this end, we present an extended model in which agents suffer from not only damages to capital stocks caused by natural disasters but also disutility of pollution. Suppose that consumers has an utility function of
The only difference of (45) from (9) is that it includes a disutility term P
which is isoelastic and convex with respect to the use of polluting input P t . Since function (45) is separable with respect to c t and P t , behavior of all agents, who takes P t as given, does not change. That is, the equilibrium outcome is exactly the same as in analyzed in sections 2 and 3.
Let us examine how the planner's problem is affected. Under resource constraints (40) and (41), the planner maximizes function (45). Then, the optimality condition with respect to polluting input becomes
When compared to (42), there is an additional marginal cost of polluting input that comes from disutility.
Similarly to the previous section, we again limit our attention to sustainable, asymptotically steady-state growth paths. In the long run, condition (46) implies
The value of the RHS critically depends on the behavior of P
. Note that, from it is strictly negative when g τ ∈ ( g τ , g lim ). This means that the RHS of (47) is zero for g τ ∈ (0, g τ ) and strictly positive when g τ ∈ ( g τ , g lim ). Therefore, as illustrated in Figure , condition (47) holds for all g τ ∈ (g max , g τ ). Whenever the asymptotic growth rate of per-unit tax is between g max and g τ , it is optimal to reduce the use of polluting input toward zero in the long run, and P t actually converges toward zero.
However, this does not necessarily mean that every tax policy with g τ ∈ (g max , g τ ) is optimal, because (47) is merely a necessarily condition for (46). A more strong condition is that both the LHS and the RHS of (46) falls toward zero at the same speed. When g τ ∈ (g max , g τ ), the asymptotic growth rate of the RHS of (46) is ). As shown in Figure , it coincides with the growth rate of P t , which is g * − g τ , if and only if
Thus the following proposition obtains. The main result is that the desirability of sustained growth does not change even when disutility of pollution is introduced into the model. However, the desirable speed at which the environmental tax is increased is now higher than the growth maximizing speed, g max . This implies that, if pollution affects the utility of agents directly, the emission of pollutant should be eliminated in the long run even at the cost of accepting a slower (although positive) rate of economic growth.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the welfare of consumers is given by (45

Concluding Remarks
The sustainability of economic growth has been analyzed in a two-sector model of endogenous growth, taking into account the risk of natural disasters. Polluting inputs are necessary for production, but they intensify the risk of natural disasters. In this setting, we obtained following results.
First, the long-run economic growth can not be sustained if the private cost of using the polluting input is kept constant. 20 Since, for simplicity, we do not consider the cost associated with extracting resources or the finiteness of those inputs, this result implies that the environmental tax rate should be increased over time.
However, it should be noted that if the private cost changes for some ignored reasons, the environmental tax rate must be adjusted to absorb those changes. More substantially, a next step in the research agenda would be to integrate the analysis of natural disasters with the studies of finiteness of natural resources, although it is beyond the scope of this first endeavor.
Second, the rate of the economic growth rate follows the inverted V-shaped curve relative to the growth rate of the environmental tax. When the rate of environmental tax is initially slow growing, its acceleration will reduce the long-run level of emission and the risk of natural disasters, which enhances the incentive to save and hence promotes economic growth. When the rate of environmental tax is already fast growing, the amount of polluting input at the steady state is fairly small so that further acceleration of environmental tax excessively impair the productivity of private firms, which works against economic growth. Therefore, the economic growth can be maximized with choice of the most gradual increase in environmental tax rate that minimizes the amount of pollution in the long-run.
Third, the sustained growth, realized by ever increasing tax rate on polluting inputs, is not only feasible but also desirable. Although economic growth ceteris paribus induces private firms to use more polluting input, an appropriate environmental policy can lead firms to use more of human capital (e.g., by investing in alternative technology), which decreases their reliance on polluting inputs. The op-20 When the damage to physical capital stock is much larger than that to human capital stock (i.e., ϕ >> ψ), the steady-state value of P * is rather large (see Equation 31 ). In this case, the speed of convergence to the steady state is slow, the economic growth declines gradually, and amount of pollution increases during the transition to the steady state.
timal speed at which the environmental tax rate is increased is lower than the growth maximizing speed if pollution only causes disasters, while it is higher when direct disutility from pollution is accounted for.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
From (18) 
B Proof of Lemma 2
On the asymptotically steady-state growth path, in whichḢ t /H t and P t are asymptotically constant, equation (18) implies that u t must also be asymptotically constant.
It means that the growth rate of u t is zero or negative (i.e., in the case of u t → 0), but from (24) we know that the TVC for human capital accumulation is satisfied only when the growth rate of u t is nonnegative. Therefore g u = 0. Next, sinceĊ t /C t and P t are asymptotically constant, equation (20) (14) and (17)- (21), we can write the dynamics of the system aṡ
where Λ and Ω are constants defined by
21 Note that, by making use of (14), (21) and N t = u t H t , Y t and P t appearing in the LHS of (17)- (20) can be expressed in terms of K t , H t , u t and τ t , where the motion of τ t is given exogenously by the government.
22 Equivalence is confirmed by that the inverse transformation is well defined. Specifically,
We first examine the stability of the steady state equilibrium path for the case of g τ ∈ (0, g max ]. As examined in Section 3.2, the (asymptotic) steady state of the transformed system, denoted by {u * , χ * , z * , P * }, is given by (31) and (35)- (33).
Applying a first-order Taylor expansion of equations (48)- (51) around this steady-
We want to show that the Jacobian matrix of (52) 
where MJ 1 denotes the sum of the principal minors of J 1 . We determine the sign of the real parts of the roots of (53) based on Theorem 1 of Benhabib and Perli (1994) . Turning to the case of g τ ∈ (g max , g lim ], the (asymptotic) steady state of the transformed system for this case is given by P * = 0 and (37)-(39) in Section 3.3. The
Taylor expansion of equations (48)- (51) around this steady-state yields essentially the same expression as (52), with the only difference that submatrix J 1 is replaced by
where g * is the asymptotic growth rate of output, which is defined by (36). Since J 2 is a triangular matrix, its eigenvalues are simply given by its diagonal elements.
Observe that g * − g τ represent the asymptotic growth rate of P t = βY t /τ t . As discussed in Section 3.3, it is negative in this case (i.e., when g τ ∈ (g max , g lim )).
Therefore, J 2 has one positive eigenvalue (χ * ) and two negative ones (−z
and g * − g τ ). This completes the stability analysis for that case of g τ ∈ (g max , g lim ) and the proof of Lemma 4.
23 This can be confirmed by noting that TrJ 1 is linear in g τ and confirming TrJ 1 > 0 at both g τ = g max and g τ = 0.
Referee Appendix
Optimization of the Household (Section 2.2)
The current value Hamiltonian for the maximization problem is:
where ν t and µ t are the shadow prices associated with the accumulation of physical capital and human capital, respectively. The optimality conditions are
The transversality conditions for physical capital stock and human capital stock, respectively, are 
From (54) and (56), the the Keynes-Ramsey Rule is −θċ
Differentiating logarithmically with respect to time in (55) and using (56) and (58), we obtain the arbitrage condition between human capital investment and physical capital investment:ẇ (60) into (64) yields the optimality condition with respect to polluting input (46).
Optimization of the Social Planner (Section 4)
−θ t − ν o = 0,(59)H u = ν o t (1 − α − β) Y t u t − µ o t BH t = 0,(60)H P = ν o t β Y t P t − ν o t ϕK t − µ o t ψ t H t = 0,(61)ν o t ν o t = ρ − ( α Y t K t − (δ K + ϕP t ) ) = 0,(62)µ o t µ o t = ρ − ν o t µ o t (1 − α − β) Y t H t − ( B(1 − u t ) − (δ H + ψ t P t ) ) = 0,(63)
